Self-stabilization is a versatile approach to fault-tolerance since it permits a distributed system to recover from any transient fault that arbitrarily corrupts the contents of all memories in the system. Byzantine tolerance is an attractive feature of distributed systems that permits to cope with arbitrary malicious behaviors.
Introduction
The advent of ubiquitous large-scale distributed systems advocates that tolerance to various kinds of faults and hazards must be included from the very early design of such systems. Self-stabilization [2, 3, 15] is a versatile technique that permits forward recovery from any kind of transient faults, while Byzantine Fault-tolerance [11] is traditionally used to mask the effect of a limited number of malicious faults. Making distributed systems tolerant to both transient and malicious faults is appealing yet proved difficult [4, 1, 14] as impossibility results are expected in many cases.
Related Works A promizing path towards multitolerance to both transient and Byzantine faults is Byzantine containment. For local tasks (i.e. tasks whose correctness can be checked locally, such as vertex coloring, link coloring, or dining philosophers), the notion of strict stabilization was proposed [14, 13] . Strict stabilization guarantees that there exists a containment radius outside which the effect of permanent faults is masked, provided that the problem specification makes it possible to break the causality chain that is caused by the faults. As many problems are not local, it turns out that it is impossible to provide strict stabilization for those. To circumvent impossibility results, the weaker notion of strong stabilization was proposed [12, 7] : here, correct nodes outside the containment radius may be perturbated by the actions of Byzantine node, but only a finite number of times.
Recently, the idea of generalizing strict and strong stabilization to an area that depends on the graph topology and the problem to be solved rather than an arbitrary fixed containment radius was proposed [5, 6] and denoted by topology aware strict (and strong) stabilization. When maximizable metric trees are considered, [5] proposed an optimal (with respect to impossibility results) protocol for topology-aware strict stabilization, and for the simpler case of breath-first-search metric trees, [6] presented a protocol that is optimal both with respect to strict and strong variants of topologyaware stabilization. The case of optimality for topology-aware strong stabilization in the general maximal metric case remains open.
Our Contribution In this paper, we investigate the possibility of topology-aware strong stabilization for tasks that are global (i.e. for with there exists a causality chain of size r, where r depends on n the size of the network), and focus on the maximum metric tree problem. In more details, we provide two necessary conditions to perform Byzantine containment for maximum metric tree construction. First, we characterize a specific class of maximizable metrics (which includes breath-first-search and shortest path metrics) that prevents the exitence of strong stabilizing solutions. Then, we generalize an impossibilty result of [6] that provides a lower bound on the containmemt area for topology-aware strong stabilization.
Model and Definitions

State Model
A distributed system S = (P, L) consists of a set P = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } of processes and a set L of bidirectional communication links (simply called links). A link is an unordered pair of distinct processes. A distributed system S can be regarded as a graph whose vertex set is P and whose link set is L, so we use graph terminology to describe a distributed system S. We use the following notations: n = |P |, m = |L| and d(u, v) denotes the shortest path between two processes u and v (i.e the length of the shortest path between u and v).
Processes u and v are called
The set of neighbors of a process v is denoted by N v . We do not assume existence of a unique identifier for each process. Instead we assume each process can distinguish its neighbors from each other by locally labelling them.
In this paper, we consider distributed systems of arbitrary topology. We assume that a single process is distinguished as a root, and all the other processes are identical. We adopt the shared state model as a communication model in this paper, where each process can directly read the states of its neighbors.
The variables that are maintained by processes denote process states. A process may take actions during the execution of the system. An action is simply a function that is executed in an atomic manner by the process. The action executed by each process is described by a finite set of guarded actions of the form guard −→ statement . Each guard of process u is a boolean expression involving the variables of u and its neighbors.
A global state of a distributed system is called a configuration and is specified by a product of states of all processes. We define C to be the set of all possible configurations of a distributed system S. For a process set R ⊆ P and two configurations ρ and ρ ′ , we denote ρ R → ρ ′ when ρ changes to ρ ′ by executing an action of each process in R simultaneously. Notice that ρ and ρ ′ can be different only in the states of processes in R. For completeness of execution semantics, we should clarify the configuration resulting from simultaneous actions of neighboring processes. The action of a process depends only on its state at ρ and the states of its neighbors at ρ, and the result of the action reflects on the state of the process at ρ ′ .
We say that a process is enabled in a configuration ρ if the guard of at least one of its actions is evaluated as true in ρ.
A schedule of a distributed system is an infinite sequence of process sets. Let Q = R 1 , R 2 , . . . be a schedule, where R i ⊆ P holds for each i (i ≥ 1). An infinite sequence of configurations e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . is called an execution from an initial configuration ρ 0 by a schedule Q, if e satisfies
. Process actions are executed atomically, and we distinguish some properties on the scheduler (or daemon). A distributed daemon schedules the actions of processes such that any subset of processes can simultaneously execute their actions. We say that the daemon is central if it schedules action of only one process at any step. The set of all possible executions from ρ 0 ∈ C is denoted by E ρ 0 . The set of all possible executions is denoted by E, that is, E = ρ∈C E ρ . We consider asynchronous distributed systems where we can make no assumption on schedules.
In this paper, we consider (permanent) Byzantine faults: a Byzantine process (i.e. a Byzantinefaulty process) can make arbitrary behavior independently from its actions. If v is a Byzantine process, v can repeatedly change its variables arbitrarily. For a given execution, the number of faulty processes is arbitrary but we assume that the root process is never faulty.
Self-Stabilizing Protocols Resilient to Byzantine Faults
Problems considered in this paper are so-called static problems, i.e. they require the system to find static solutions. For example, the spanning-tree construction problem is a static problem, while the mutual exclusion problem is not. Some static problems can be defined by a specification predicate (shortly, specification), spec(v), for each process v: a configuration is a desired one (with a solution) if every process satisfies spec(v). A specification spec(v) is a boolean expression on variables of P v (⊆ P ) where P v is the set of processes whose variables appear in spec(v). The variables appearing in the specification are called output variables (shortly, O-variables) . In what follows, we consider a static problem defined by specification spec(v).
A self-stabilizing protocol ( [2] ) is a protocol that eventually reaches a legitimate configuration, where spec(v) holds at every process v, regardless of the initial configuration. Once it reaches a legitimate configuration, every process never changes its O-variables and always satisfies spec (v) . From this definition, a self-stabilizing protocol is expected to tolerate any number and any type of transient faults since it can eventually recover from any configuration affected by the transient faults. However, the recovery from any configuration is guaranteed only when every process correctly executes its action from the configuration, i.e., we do not consider existence of permanently faulty processes.
When (permanent) Byzantine processes exist, Byzantine processes may not satisfy spec(v). In addition, correct processes near the Byzantine processes can be influenced and may be unable to satisfy spec(v). Nesterenko and Arora [14] define a strictly stabilizing protocol as a self-stabilizing protocol resilient to unbounded number of Byzantine processes.
Given an integer c, a c-correct process is a process defined as follows.
Definition 1 (c-correct process)
A process is c-correct if it is correct ( i.e. not Byzantine) and located at distance more than c from any Byzantine process.
given at most f Byzantine processes, in any execution starting from ρ, every c-correct process v always satisfies spec(v) and never changes its O-variables.
The parameter c of Definition 2 refers to the containment radius defined in [14] . The parameter f refers explicitly to the number of Byzantine processes, while [14] dealt with unbounded number of Byzantine faults (that is f ∈ {0 . . . n}).
Definition 3 ((c, f )-strict stabilization) A protocol is (c, f )-strictly stabilizing for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . contains a configuration ρ i that is (c, f )-contained for spec.
An important limitation of the model of [14] is the notion of r-restrictive specifications. Intuitively, a specification is r-restrictive if it prevents combinations of states that belong to two processes u and v that are at least r hops away. An important consequence related to Byzantine tolerance is that the containment radius of protocols solving those specifications is at least r. For some (global) problems r can not be bounded by a constant. In consequence, we can show that there exists no (c, 1)-strictly stabilizing protocol for such a problem for any (finite) integer c.
Strong stabilization To circumvent such impossibility results, [7] defines a weaker notion than the strict stabilization. Here, the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. there may exist processes outside the containment radius that invalidate the specification predicate, due to Byzantine actions. However, the impact of Byzantine triggered action is limited in times: the set of Byzantine processes may only impact processes outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if Byzantine processes execute an infinite number of actions.
In the following of this section, we recall the formal definition of strong stabilization adopted in [7] . From the states of c-correct processes, c-legitimate configurations and c-stable configurations are defined as follows.
Definition 4 (c-legitimate configuration) A configuration ρ is c-legitimate for spec if every c-correct process v satisfies spec(v).
Definition 5 (c-stable configuration) A configuration ρ is c-stable if every c-correct process never changes the values of its O-variables as long as Byzantine processes make no action.
Roughly speaking, the aim of self-stabilization is to guarantee that a distributed system eventually reaches a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. However, a self-stabilizing system can be disturbed by Byzantine processes after reaching a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. The c-disruption represents the period where c-correct processes are disturbed by Byzantine processes and is defined as follows
) is a c-disruption if and only if the following holds:
1. e is finite,
e contains at least one action of a c-correct process for changing the value of an O-variable,
3. ρ 0 is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable, and 4. ρ t is the first configuration after ρ 0 such that ρ t is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable. Now we can define a self-stabilizing protocol such that Byzantine processes may only impact processes outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if Byzantine processes execute an infinite number of actions. Note that a (t, k, c, f )-time contained configuration is a (c, f )-contained configuration when t = k = 0, and thus, (t, k, c, f )-time contained configuration is a generalization (relaxation) of a (c, f )-contained configuration. Thus, a strongly stabilizing protocol is weaker than a strictly stabilizing one (as processes outside the containment radius may take incorrect actions due to Byzantine influence). However, a strongly stabilizing protocol is stronger than a classical selfstabilizing one (that may never meet their specification in the presence of Byzantine processes).
The parameters t, k and c are introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do not require each process to know the values of the parameters.
Topology-aware Byzantine resilience We saw previously that there exist a number of impossibility results on strict stabilization due to the notion of r-restrictives specifications. To circumvent this impossibility result, we describe here another weaker notion than the strict stabilization: the topology-aware strict stabilization (denoted by TA strict stabilization for short) introduced by [5] . Here, the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. the set of processes which may be disturbed by Byzantine ones is not reduced to the union of c-neighborhood of Byzantine processes (i.e. the set of processes at distance at most c from a Byzantine process) but can be defined depending on the graph topology and Byzantine processes location.
In the following, we give formal definition of this new kind of Byzantine containment. From now, B denotes the set of Byzantine processes and S B (which is function of B) denotes a subset of V (intuitively, this set gathers all processes which may be disturbed by Byzantine processes).
Definition 9 (S B -correct node) A node is S B -correct if it is a correct node ( i.e. not Byzantine) which not belongs to S B .
Definition 10 (S B -legitimate configuration) A configuration ρ is S B -legitimate for spec if every S B -correct node v is legitimate for spec ( i.e. if spec(v) holds).
Definition 11 ((S B , f )-topology-aware containment) A configuration ρ 0 is (S B , f )-topologyaware contained for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, in any execution e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . ., every configuration is S B -legitimate and every S B -correct process never changes its O-variables.
The parameter S B of Definition 11 refers to the containment area. Any process which belongs to this set may be infinitely disturbed by Byzantine processes. The parameter f refers explicitly to the number of Byzantine processes.
Definition 12 ((S B , f )-topology-aware strict stabilization) A protocol is (S B , f )-topologyaware strictly stabilizing for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . contains a configuration ρ i that is (S B , f )-topology-aware contained for spec.
Note that, if B denotes the set of Byzantine processes and
then a (S B , f )-topology-aware strictly stabilizing protocol is a (c, f )-strictly stabilizing protocol. Then, the concept of topology-aware strict stabilization is a generalization of the strict stabilization. However, note that a TA strictly stabilizing protocol is stronger than a classical self-stabilizing protocol (that may never meet their specification in the presence of Byzantine processes). The parameter S B is introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do not require each process to know the actual definition of the set.
Similarly to topology-aware strict stabilization, we can weaken the notion of strong stabilization using the notion of containment area. This idea was introduced by [6] . We recall in the following the formal definition of this concept. 3 Maximum Metric Tree Construction
Definition 13 (S B -stable configuration) A configuration ρ is S B -stable if every S B -correct process never changes the values of its O-variables as long as Byzantine processes make no action.
Definition 14 (S
B -TA-disruption) A portion of execution e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . , ρ t (t > 1) is a S B - TA-disruption
Definition and Specification
In this work, we deal with maximum (routing) metric trees as defined in [9] . Informally, the goal of a routing protocol is to construct a tree that simultaneously maximizes the metric values of all of the nodes with respect to some total ordering ≺. In the following, we recall all definitions and notations introduced in [9] . For instance, we provide the definition of four classical metrics with this model: the shortest path metric (SP), the flow metric (F), and the reliability metric (R). Note also that we can modelise the construction of a spanning tree with no particular constraints in this model using the metric N C described below and the construction of a BFS spanning tree using the shortest path metric (SP) with W 1 = {1} (we denoted this metric by BFS in the following).
Definition 18 (Assigned metric) An assigned metric over a system S is a six-tuple (M, W, met, mr, ≺, wf ) where (M, W, met, mr, ≺) is a metric and wf is a function that assigns to each edge of S a weight in W .
Let a rooted path (from v) be a simple path from a process v to the root r. The next set of definitions are with respect to an assigned metric (M, W, met, mr, ≺, wf ) over a given system S.
Definition 19 (Metric of a rooted path) The metric of a rooted path in S is the prefix sum of met over the edge weights in the path and mr. 
Definition 21 (Maximum metric of a node)
The maximum metric of a node v = r (or simply metric value of v) in S is defined by the metric of a maximum metric path from v. The maximum metric of r is mr.
Definition 22 (Maximum metric tree) A spanning tree T of S is a maximum metric tree with respect to an assigned metric over S if and only if every rooted path in T is a maximum metric path in S with respect to the assigned metric.
The goal of the work of [9] is the study of metrics that always allow the construction of a maximum metric tree. More formally, the definition follows.
Definition 23 (Maximizable metric) A metric is maximizable if and only if for any assignment of this metric over any system S, there is a maximum metric tree for S with respect to the assigned metric.
Given a maximizable metric M = (M, W, mr, met, ≺), the aim of this work is to study the construction of a maximum metric tree with respect to M which spans the system in a selfstabilizing way in a system subject to permanent Byzantine failures. It is obvious that these Byzantine processes may disturb some correct processes. It is why, we relax the problem in the following way: we want to construct a maximum metric forest with respect to M. The root of any tree of this forest must be either the real root or a Byzantine process.
Each process v has two O-variables: a pointer to its parent in its tree (prnt v ∈ N v ∪ {⊥}) and a level which stores its current metric value (level v ∈ M ). Obviously, Byzantine process may disturb (at least) their neighbors. We use the following specification of the problem.
We introduce new notations as follows. Given an assigned metric (M, W, met, mr, ≺, wf ) over the system S and two processes u and v, we denote by µ(u, v) the maximum metric of node u when v plays the role of the root of the system. If u and v are neighbors, we denote by w u,v the weight of the edge {u, v} (that is, the value of wf ({u, v})). 
We define the specification predicate spec(v) of the maximum metric tree construction with respect to a maximizable metric M as follows. 
Previous results
In this section, we summarize known results about maximum metric tree construction. The first interesting result about maximizable metrics is due to [9] that provides a fully characterization of maximizable metrics as follow. 
Theorem 1 (Characterization of maximizable metrics [9]) A metric is maximizable if and only if this metric is bounded and monotonic.
Secondly, [8] provides a self-stabilizing protocol to construct a maximum metric tree with respect to any maximizable metric. Now, we focus on self-stabilizating solutions resilient to Byzantine faults. Following discussion of Section 2, it is obvious that there exists no strictly stabilizing protocol for this problem. If we consider the weaker notion of topology-aware strict stabilization, [5] defines the best containment area as:
Intuitively, S B gathers correct processes that are closer (or at equal distance) from a Byzantine process than the root according to the metric. Moreover, [5] proves that the algorithm introduced for the maximum metric spanning tree construction in [8] performed this optimal containment area. More formally, [5] proves the following results. Some others works try to circumvent the impossibility result of strict stabilization using the concept ot strong stabilization but do not provide results for any maximizable metric. Indeed, [7] proves the following result about spanning tree.
Theorem 4 ([7])
There exists a (t, 0, n−1)-strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to N C (that is, for a spanning tree with no particular constraints) with a finite t.
On the other hand, regarding BFS spanning tree construction, [6] proved the following impossibility result. , there exists no (t, c, 1) -strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to BFS where t and c are two finite integers.
Theorem 5 ([6]) Even under the central daemon
These two results motivate our result related to strong stabilization in the general case (see Section 4.1) that proves a necessary condition on the maximizable metric to allow strong stabilization. Now, if we focus on topology-aware strong stabilization, [6] proved the following results. Theorem 7 ( [6] ) The protocol of [10] is a (t, S * B , n − 1)-TA strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to BFS where t is a finite integer and
In the following, we generalize the Theorem 6 to any maximizable metric (see Section 4.2).
Necessary conditions
In this section, we provide our necessary conditions about containment radius (respectively area) of any strongly stabilizing (respectively TA strongly stabilizing) protocol for the maximum metric tree construction.
Strong Stabilization
We introduce here some new definitions to characterize some important properties of maximizable metrics that are used in the following. Then, we define a specific class of maximizable metrics and we prove that it is possible to construct a maximum metric tree in a strongly-stabilizing way only if we consider such a metric. Note that N C is a strongly maximizable metric (since |M 4 | = 1) whereas BFS or SP are not (since the first one has no fixed point, the second is not strictly decreasing). If we consider the metric MET defined below, we can show that MET is a strongly maximizable metric such that |M | ≥ 2.
Now, we can state our first necessary condition. Proof We prove this result by contradiction. We assume so that M = (M, W, mr, met, ≺) is a maximizable metric such that there exist a finite integer t and a protocol P that is a (t, c, 1)-strongly stabilizing protocol for maximum metric spanning tree construction with respect to M. We distinguish the following cases (note that they are exhaustive):
Case 1: M is a strongly maximizing metric and c < |M | − 2.
As c ≥ 0, we know that |M | ≥ 2 and by definition of a strongly stabilizing metric, M is strictly decreasing, and M has one and only one fixed point.
By assumption on M, we know that there exist c + 3 distinct metric values m 0 = mr, m 1 , . . . , m c+2 in M and w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w c+1 in W such that: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c + 2},
Let S = (V, E, W) be the following weighted system V = {p 0 = r, p 1 , . . . , p 2c+2 , p 2c+3 = b}, E = {{p i , p i+1 }, i ∈ {0, . . . , 2c + 2}} and ∀i ∈ {0, c + 1}, w p i ,p i+1 = w p 2c+3−i ,p 2c+2−i = w i . Note that the choice w p c+1 ,p c+2 = w c+1 ensures us the following property when level r = level b = mr: µ(p c+1 , b) ≺ µ(p c+1 , r) (and by symmetry, µ(p c+2 , r) ≺ µ(p c+2 , b)). Process p 0 is the real root and process b is a Byzantine one. Note that the construction of W ensures the following properties when level r = level b = mr: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c + 1},
Assume that the initial configuration ρ 0 of S satisfies: prnt r = prnt b = ⊥, level r = level b = mr, and other variables of b (if any) are identical to those of r (see Figure 1 , variables of other processes may be arbitrary). Assume now that b takes exactly the same actions as r (if any) immediately after r. Then, by symmetry of the execution and by convergence of P to spec, we can deduce that the system reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ 1 (see Figure 1 ) in which: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c + 1}, prnt p i = p i−1 , level p i = µ(p i , r) = m i and ∀i ∈ {c + 2, . . . , 2c + 2}, prnt p i = p i+1 and level p i = µ(p i , b) = m 2c+3−i (because this configuration is the only one in which all correct process v satisfies spec(v) when prnt r = prnt b = ⊥ and level r = level b = mr by construction of W). Note that ρ 1 is c-legitimate and c-stable.
Assume now that the Byzantine process acts as a correct process and executes correctly its algorithm. Then, by convergence of P in fault-free systems (remember that a stronglystabilizing algorithm is a special case of self-stabilizing algorithm), we can deduce that the system reach in a finite time a configuration ρ 2 (see Figure 1 ) in which: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 2c + 3}, prnt p i = p i−1 and level p i = µ(p i , r) (because this configuration is the only one in which all process v satisfies spec(v)). Note that the portion of execution between ρ 1 and ρ 2 contains at least one c-perturbation (p c+2 is a c-correct process and modifies at least once its O-variables) and that ρ 2 is c-legitimate and c-stable.
Assume now that the Byzantine process b takes the following state: prnt b = ⊥ and level b = mr. This step brings the system into configuration ρ 3 (see Figure 1) . From this configuration, we can repeat the execution we constructed from ρ 0 . By the same token, we obtain an execution of P which contains c-legitimate and c-stable configurations (see ρ 1 ) and an infinite Assume now that b takes exactly the same actions as r (if any) immediately after r (note that r / ∈ A * B and hence prnt r = ⊥ and level r = mr still hold by closure and then prnt b = ⊥ and level b = mr still hold too). Then, by symmetry of the execution and by convergence of P to spec, we can deduce that the system reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ 1 (see Figure 6 ) in which: prnt r = prnt b = ⊥, prnt u = prnt u ′ = r, prnt v = prnt v ′ = b, level r = level b = mr, and level u = level u ′ = level v = level v ′ = m (because this configuration is the only one in which all correct process v satisfies spec(v) when prnt r = prnt b = ⊥ and level r = level b = mr since met(m, w ′ ) ≺ m). Note that ρ 1 is A * B -legitimate for spec and A * B -stable (whatever A * B is). Assume now that b behaves as a correct processor with respect to P. Then, by convergence of P in a fault-free system starting from ρ 1 which is not legitimate (remember that a TA-strongly stabilizing algorithm is a special case of self-stabilizing algorithm), we can deduce that the system reach in a finite time a configuration ρ 2 (see Figure 6 ) in which: prnt r = ⊥, prnt u = prnt u ′ = r, prnt v = u, prnt v ′ = u ′ , prnt b = v (or prnt b = v ′ ), level r = mr, level u = level u ′ = m level v = level v ′ = met(m, w ′ ) = m ′ , and level b = met(m ′ , w) = m ′′ . Note that processes v and v ′ modify their O-variables in the portion of execution between ρ 1 and ρ 2 and that ρ 2 is A * B -legitimate for spec and A * B -stable (whatever A * B is). Consequently, this portion of execution contains at least one A * B -TA-disruption (whatever A * B is). Assume now that the Byzantine process b takes the following state: prnt b = ⊥ and level b = mr. This step brings the system into configuration ρ 3 (see Figure 6) . From this configuration, we can repeat the execution we constructed from ρ 0 . By the same token, we obtain an execution of P which contains c-legitimate and c-stable configurations (see ρ 1 ) and an infinite number of A * B -TA-disruption (whatever A * B is) which contradicts the (t, A * B , 1)-TA-strong stabilization of P. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented two necessary conditions to achieve strong stabilization and topologyaware strong stabilization in maximum metric tree construction. Our work obviously leads to the following open question: is there a topology-aware strongly stabilizing protocol that ensures a containmemt area equal to S * B ? We conjecture that it is the case. 
